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Introduction 
While the concerns of the current AHRC research programme relate to instrumentality 
in the museums and galleries sector it is the case that this policy form has a much 
wider spread than simply this sector. Indeed, the development of instrumentalism has 
had a clear impact across the entire cultural policy sector (Gray, 2007), and can also 
be found in other sectors altogether. Instrumental policy has taken multiple forms 
across a wide range of policy sectors and is far more fragmented in terms of 
organisation, intention and location than the general term may imply. There have been 
multiple factors behind the spread of instrumental policies and, similarly, there have 
been multiple outcomes in the form of differing policies, with differing emphases and 
differing outcomes in their creation, implementation and consequences of, and for, 
this instrumentalisation process. The intention of this paper is to locate 
instrumentalisation within the context of changes in the structures and processes that 
are utilised for the public management of goods and services, and to identify the 
potential and actual results of an instrumentalisation of public policies within the 
cultural sector.  
 
Instrumentality and Museums and Galleries 
There are a range of indicators, both explicit and implicit, that can be used to 
demonstrate the significance of instrumental policy forms for the museums and 
galleries sector in Britain. The increasing expectations for clear statements of 
performance assessment, justifications for public funding, and evidence of policy 
effectiveness across the public sector (these will be discussed further at a later stage) 
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have generated an emphasis on formal statements of organisational intent. In this 
respect the cultural sector is no different to the rest of the public sector, and a range of 
expectations for the contribution of these services to a range of policy objectives can 
be identified. 
 
The Museums, Libraries and Archives Council (MLA), for example, has identified a 
range of arenas that museums are meant to contribute to, only a minority of which are 
directly concerned with the central elements of museum practice. Renaissance in the 
Regions (Re:source, 2001, pp. 36-9) identifies these areas as being a contribution to 
‘collections for inspiration and creativity’; ‘excellence and high quality in delivering 
core services’; education and learning; access and inclusion; economic regeneration; 
and modernisation and rationalisation. More recently the ‘strategic priorities’ of the 
MLA have been identified as being concerned with children and young people, 
communities, economy and delivery (Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
(DCMS), 2006a). In each case the museums sector, in particular, is effectively being 
used as a tool for the attainment of the policy objectives of actors and concerns that 
have traditionally been seen to lie outside of the museums sector itself. 
 
At a different geographical level – that of local government - a similar picture can be 
seen. The Audit Commission Key Lines of Enquiry for assessing the performance of 
local authorities in delivering goods and services has, in the case of cultural services, 
a clear statement of the need for these services to demonstrate their success in 
‘meeting local, regional and national objectives’ in terms of ‘healthier communities’, 
‘safer and stronger communities’, ‘economic vitality’, ‘learning’, and ‘quality of life 
for local people’ (Audit Commission, 2005, pp. 8-12). At the very least this indicates 
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that cultural services are seen as having an impact across more than their own sectoral 
concerns. At the worst it could mean that these exogenous effects are the only ones 
that are seen as being of importance in assessing organisational effectiveness in the 
museums and galleries sector. 
 
Whilst the identification of which of these positions has been adopted in practice is a 
matter for empirical investigation, it is clearly the case that the connection of 
museums to questions of wider public policy opens the possibility for an 
instrumentalisation of the museums (and, by implication, galleries) sector. In this 
respect Vestheim (1994, p. 65) has defined instrumental policy in the context of 
cultural policy as being ‘to use cultural ventures and cultural investments as a means 
or instrument to attain goals in other than cultural areas’. Given that all public policy 
is instrumental in the sense that it is intended to achieve something what requires 
examination is the specific nature of the instrumentality that is concerned in any given 
case (Gray, 2007, p. 205). Vestheim’s vision is one where there is a diversion of 
primary intention away from the core specifics of a policy sector towards the interests 
and concerns of other policy sectors altogether.  
 
In the case of the museum and galleries sector, if the core is seen to exist in the areas 
of curatorship, education, entertainment and infra-structural management of resources 
(such as buildings, staff, marketing, income generation) then instrumentality would 
mean a shift away from these, either completely or in large measure, towards other 
policy intentions altogether. This would mean that internal matters of policy emphasis 
concerned with the sector’s core (a greater stress on entertainment at the expense of 
education, for example) would become replaced by a concern for social inclusion 
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(Newman and McLean, 1998; 2006) or community regeneration (IDeA, 2004), or any 
of a number of other governmental objectives. Whilst it is clear that there has been a 
much greater emphasis upon these exogenous policy concerns than was the case 30 or 
40 years ago the extent to which an instrumentalisation of the museums and galleries 
sector has taken place remains to be seen. Examining the processes by which a shift in 
emphasis towards a greater instrumentalisation (at the very least) of the museums and 
galleries sector has taken place will allow the identification of underlying factors 
which have affected this process and the potential consequences of it for the sector in 
the future. 
 
State Change and Public Policy 
The development of instrumental policies in the cultural sector would appear, in the 
first instance, to be a consequential effect of broader changes that have been taking 
place within the machinery of the state since the mid-1970s (Vestheim, 1994; Gray, 
2007).These changes have had an effect upon what the state does, how it does it, and 
the justifications and reasons that have been put forward to explain them. While it 
may be tempting to view these changes as a marking a form of political-administrative 
‘year zero’ with sweeping reforms affecting all parts of the machinery of state in like 
fashion, they are quite clearly part of a continuous process of state re-structuring that 
has been an ever-present part of all systems of public administration. Equally as 
clearly, the re-organisations and re-structurings of state organisations since the 1970s 
have yet to reach a state of completion – similar processes of state change are 
continuing to take place today. Regardless of this, an examination of these changes is 
required to understand how an instrumentalisation of public policies could be seen to 
be a development from them. 
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In terms of British cultural policy the reforms of state structures and administration 
have been summed up as representing either a form of privatisation (Wu, 2002; 
Alexander and Rueschemeyer, 2005, pp. 71-4), or of commodification (Gray, 2000). 
While the former deals with either the disposal of state assets to private actors or the 
increasing intervention of private actors in the management and administration of 
public assets (Young, 1986, pp. 238-44), the latter refers to broader political changes 
involving a shift from use-value to exchange-value as a consequence of ideological 
changes within the state. In both cases, however, there is a recognition that these 
forms of change require a shift in how organisations will work in the process of 
delivering goods and services before they can become effective. 
 
At a general level the changes that have taken place to the machinery of state began as 
part of the reforms that took place under the label ‘the New Public Management’ 
(NPM), before changing tack into a somewhat different (‘modernising’) model of 
public management in recent years. The core ideas underlying NPM were: 
 Decentralisation of managerial control 
 Managerial empowerment: ‘letting managers manage’ 
 Concentration on results (outputs and outcomes) rather than inputs and 
processes 
 The promotion of competition in the provision of public services 
 The promotion of performance measurement 
 Management through contract rather than hierarchy (Osborne and 
McLaughlin, 2002, p. 9; Pollitt, 2003a, pp. 27-8). 
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The process of introducing these into the public sector led to the introduction of a host 
of new organisational forms and administrative and managerial techniques, ranging 
from the development of new general governance arrangements (Bache and Flinders, 
2004; Wilson, 2005) to the introduction of specific practices and managerial forms 
such as Public Service and Local Area Agreements. The extent to which these 
changes have actually led to equally as wide-ranging changes in formal and informal 
working practices is, however, another matter. While the potential for there to be 
significant effects on these in public sector organisations is evident (in the case of 
cultural organisations, for example, see the arguments in Belfiore, 2004; Protherough 
and Pick, 2002), the reality is somewhat less clear-cut. While the NPM was 
introduced to have significant effects upon how the public sector was organised and 
functioned - and there is evidence that there have been some anticipated 
improvements in public sector operations and service delivery - many of the hoped-
for improvements have either not been delivered at all or have only ambiguously 
succeeded (Pollitt, 2002; Ovretveit, 2005; Joyce, 2007). 
 
If at the level of general results the NPM reform programme has had some intended 
effects – even if not as many as its’ proponents may have wished to see – there have 
also been many unintended consequences (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, especially ch. 7). 
These have, at the very least, diluted the intentions of NPM and, in some cases, have 
led to a retreat from the underlying principles of NPM and the development of new 
organisational forms and practices to ameliorate some of the problems that reform has 
bought in its’ wake. In the British case, for example, the organisational fragmentation 
of central government that was created by the establishment of Executive Agencies 
(or, more formally, Non-Departmental Public Bodies) following the publication of the 
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Ibbs Report (1988) led to problems of accountability, managerial responsibility and 
the relationship of elected politicians and appointed managers – with the prime 
example being that of the clash between the then Home Secretary Michael Howard 
and the then head of the Prison Service, Derek Lewis. One of the results of this was 
the introduction of new mechanisms to ‘join-up’ public policy and develop effective 
co-ordination between fragmented organisations. This, in turn, has had some, but 
limited, success in achieving the intention of the process but has also generated many 
more unintended consequences (Ling, 2002; Pollitt, 2003b; for joining-up in the 
cultural sector see Gray, 2004). 
 
The lack of effective organisational co-ordination in the pursuit of central 
governmental policy objectives as a result of these changes has also seen the 
generation of a variety of new tools to allow the centre to introduce or impose overall 
policy cohesion. Central government has always made use of a wide range of tools to 
manage the policy process – particularly with regard to non-central government 
institutions (such as local authorities, Executive Agencies and the National Health 
Service, let alone the plethora of new governance arrangements that are in place). A 
combination of circulars, confirmatory and appellate powers, adjudication, inspection, 
default powers and audit, the control of local officers, local bills, grants and 
borrowing, and the use of policy planning systems, alongside general legislative and 
financial controls have been frequently used in the past in attempts to ensure that 
central wishes are abided by (Gray, 1994, pp. 80-90). More recently these have been 
joined by the use of NPM-inspired performance measurement tools such as 
Comprehensive Performance Assessments (themselves to be replaced by 
Comprehensive Area Assessments in 2009), Best Value Indicators, Key Lines of 
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Enquiry for Service Inspection, Local Area, Funding and Public Service Agreements, 
all of which provide explicit criteria against which service provision can be assessed. 
New organisational forms, such as Local Strategic Partnerships and Regional 
Development Agencies, and other forms of partnership, network and contract 
arrangements have also been introduced for managing the delivery of public services. 
 
The precise manner in which this wide range of devices are actually employed by 
governmental actors - at all levels - will be affected by the goals that different actors 
have, their access to control of these mechanisms and organisational forms, and the 
uses to which they wish to put them. The underlying intention is that forms of 
management, control and assessment will allow for an effective (and potentially 
efficient) exercise of authority over organisations, individuals and actions. As much of 
this exercise of power and authority is concerned with ensuring that the top-down 
intentions of central political actors are lived up to, the relationship between these 
central actors and those beyond the remit of central government becomes important 
for understanding precisely how these devices have an effect on the choices and 
activities of policy actors, and on how far central actors are actually able to exercise 
effective control over policy sectors. 
 
This becomes particularly important in the context of the new raft of performance 
measurement techniques that have been introduced into the political system. Whilst 
these derive initially from the introduction of ideas from the NPM they have been 
given support by both the attempt to move towards ‘evidence-based’ policy (Parsons, 
2000; Sanderson, 2002), and through the development of organisational mechanisms 
that are designed to ensure a coherency in the pursuit of public policy objectives in the 
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context of increasingly complex patterns of inter-organisational governance (Kjaer, 
2004, ch. 2; Bache and Flinders, 2004). The former of these, based on a particularly 
positivist methodology, depends upon there being appropriate measures in place to 
capture the complexities of both the causes and consequences of public policy. The 
latter requires a transferable set of assessment techniques across a range of dissimilar 
(if not directly contradictory) organisations and organisational objectives.  
 
As with NPM in general performance measurement has produced a range of intended 
and unintended consequences (Bache, 2003). In the context of cultural policy, 
however, the validity of the entire process of performance measurement is open to 
question given the problems that the sector has with questions of definition, causality, 
measurement, attribution and the structure of the sector itself (Gray, forthcoming). 
Equally, the new organisational forms that have been created for managing cultural 
policy have either been largely ineffective (as in the case of attempting to ‘join-up’ 
cultural policy (Gray, 2004)), or have tended to place the cultural sector as a 
peripheral component to the ‘real’ core of policy activity which is to be found in the 
pursuit of other policy objectives altogether – such as economic regeneration, life-
long learning or social inclusion. 
 
    
Sector Specificity 
There are clear consequences that arise from the attempt to impose a top-down model 
of public policy management for the cultural sector. These arise as a result of the 
particularly specific nature of the sector itself and have a direct impact upon the 
development of instrumental policy forms within the sector. The cultural policy sector 
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is associated with certain structural and behavioural characteristics that serve to place 
it in a politically weak position when compared with other policy sectors.  
 
Firstly there is the issue of how governments deal with matters of cultural policy. The 
range of approaches that states can adopt to matters of cultural policy can be placed 
on a continuum from direct responsibility and control of cultural affairs, usually in 
either an ‘engineer’ (as in China) or ‘architect’ (as in France) fashion, to working 
through arm’s-length quangos or other intermediate institutions (such as the MLA or 
Arts Council England, or the Australia Council for the Arts (Craik, 2007), or through 
even more remote mechanisms such as tax incentive schemes (as in the United States) 
(see Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989; Craik, 2007, Appendix C). While 
most governments are prepared to take some sort of responsibility for cultural policy 
the tendency is for them to adopt relatively indirect forms of involvement. The 
advantages for governments in taking this role are that they can have some effect on 
the sector by producing general policies but, at the same time, they can avoid being 
held directly responsible or accountable for the specific policy choices that are then 
made on their behalf. 
 
In the case of the museums and galleries part of the cultural policy sector, for 
example, while central government has provided a general legislative framework 
dating back to the British Museum Act of 1753, the Museums Act of 1845 and the 
Public Library and Museums Act of 1892 there is little in the way of direct, hands-on 
control by central government of the detailed day-to-day functioning of these 
institutions. Indeed, as with much of the cultural sector, the provision of a large 
number of museums and galleries in Britain (40% of all registered museums) is 
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through discretionary, rather than statutory, powers (Lawley, 2003, pp. 75-6), leaving 
choice in the hands of local, not national, actors. Even with the ‘national’ museums 
the role of the centre appears to consist of establishing the direction of general policy 
(through the use of mechanisms such as funding agreements), rather than with a direct 
concern with how the targets that are established for these museums are to be met. 
The consequences of this lack of ability to directly control the day-to-day managerial 
detail of service delivery are that it is likely that there will be a diversity in approach 
adopted within the museums and galleries sector and a lack of policy co-ordination 
across differing geographical levels. The result of this is not only that there will be the 
creation of un-co-ordinated policies between organisations but also the possibility, if 
not probability, that contradictory policies may be created where the interests, 
expectations and intentions of policy actors at different levels and in different 
organisations not only fail to meet but actively oppose each other (Kiwan, 2007). 
 
A secondary consequence of this is that attempts to create a more co-ordinated 
approach to sectoral policies (through ‘joining-up’ policies for example) are 
problematic - to say the least - as a consequence of the existence of multiple 
organisations, plans, types of policy and foci of policy in this field (Gray, 2004). This 
multiplicity of policy action can lead to a position where governments are reduced to 
making major policy demands that are operationally vacuous or simply impossible to 
control and manage effectively (Hooper-Greenhill, 2004, pp. 152-4; Gray, 2006). This 
can, perhaps, be most clearly seen in the priorities that the DCMS has established for 
the museums sector where the word ‘will’ becomes a mantra rather than a clear set of 
organisationally-achievable objectives, and seem to rely on exhortation to a group of 
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independent organisations rather than direct, hands-on, top-down managerial control 
(Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2006b, pp.27-8). 
 
In part this difficulty can be related to a secondary structural feature of the cultural 
policy sector, that of the lack of political support, not only at the national level but 
also at the local level (Gray, 2002), that it has, particularly in comparison with many 
other policy sectors. Whilst governmental rhetoric from Ministers within the DCMS 
stresses the importance of cultural policy in its’ own right rather than simply as an 
instrumental mechanism (see Smith, 1998; Jowell, 2004) it is commonly the case that 
further levels of political support are relatively limited. This political weakness of the 
cultural sector is not restricted to Britain and has the clear effect of limiting the extent 
to which culture can garner the administrative and political support that it needs to 
make an impact in terms of more politically ‘relevant’ policy sectors (Gray, 
forthcoming). (Whether the current Cultural Pathfinders project (Local Government 
Association/Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2005) will start to reverse this 
position remains to be seen). The result of this is that the cultural sector as a whole, 
and parts of the sector individually, are vulnerable to pressure from other policy 
sectors that have a perceived greater political importance or credibility. This 
differentiation between sectors of ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics (Bulpitt, 1983) has real 
consequences for the cultural sector – not least of which has been the recent drift 
towards an instrumentalisation of policy within it, where areas of ‘high’ political 
significance (such as education or community cohesion) become the focus towards 
which cultural policy is often turned. 
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Other sectorally-specific features of the cultural policy arena can be identified as 
being organisational fragmentation; variation in the geographical scale that it operates 
within; a tendency towards reactive, rather than proactive, policy activity within the 
sector; and the absence of a clearly-defined area of action (Gray, 2006). Each of these 
can contribute, in specific cases, towards policy instrumentalisation as well but could 
be regarded as being of less importance in this respect than the low priority that 
governments tend to give to issues of cultural policy and the low political significance 
that the sector as a whole has. 
 
Explaining Instrumentalisation 
The endogenous features that are specific to the cultural sector and the exogenous 
features derived from state and managerial changes, have combined to create a 
position where the pressures towards an instrumentalisation of cultural policies have 
become stronger than in the past. While there has always been an element of multi-
functionalism within cultural policies – having multiple effects across a number of 
areas – the current developments in Britain have made the nature of the linkages 
between different policy sectors more explicit and apparent than they were 30 years 
ago.  
 
The commodification of public policies since the mid-1970s has had a number of 
consequences: a change in focus in terms of who would be identified as the 
beneficiaries of public policies (from the social collectivity to the individual 
consumer); a greater selectiveness in terms of the intended audiences or recipients of 
policies; a greater direction in terms of the intended impact of policies; and a greater 
level of information about the costs and methods of financing policies being made 
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available. The policy process has become more fragmented and economically (rather 
than politically) rational, and a more limited set of criteria for assessing policy choices 
are, arguably, being used (Gray, 2000, pp. 25-9). When allied with the focus within 
NPM on performance measurement it is to be expected that there would be a greater 
attention paid to the precise mechanics of creating and implementing policies across 
sectors. The identification of clearly stated policy objectives by governments allows 
for a more precise set of tools to manage the attainment of these objectives to be 
developed – at least at a general, systemic, level. 
 
For cultural policy the inherent political weaknesses of the sector make it particularly 
vulnerable to exogenous political pressures. A result of this could that if these 
pressures become great enough there may be ‘a massive intervention by previously 
uninvolved political actors and governmental institutions … as the issue is redefined, 
or as new dimensions of the debate become more salient, new actors feel qualified to 
exert their authority’ (True et al, 2007, p. 159). The implication being that a re-
direction of the policy sector as a whole, or individual components within it, could be 
expected if external political forces become strong enough to choose to intervene. In 
this respect an explanation of some of the pressures towards and instrumentalisation 
of cultural (and museums and galleries) policy can therefore be found in the 
increasing attempt to make use of cultural resources for wider policy aims than those 
to be found within the sector itself. Indeed, these pressures may be even greater if the 
external policy intentions already overlap with elements inside the cultural sector. 
Thus the use of Generic Learning Outcomes to assess the impact of museums and 
galleries on education and learning ties together not only museums and galleries with 
central government’s life-long learning initiatives, but also emphasises this element of 
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the work of museums and galleries over others, as well as providing a means by 
which performance measures can be utilised to assess the success of museums and 
galleries in fulfilling central governmental policy objectives. In this respect it is an 
empirical question as to whether what is taking place is a full-blown 
instrumentalisation of museum and galleries policy or whether it is a re-direction of 
policy within the sector towards one component part of the overall work of the sector.  
 
In other areas, such as the use of museums and galleries as tools for social inclusion or 
economic regeneration a clearer image of instrumentalisation is evident. As these 
have not been traditionally seen as being core components of the work of the cultural 
sector (Bennett, 1995, pp. 205-7 sees the economic importance of the cultural sector 
as being an underlying theme providing support for state interventions into the 
cultural sector in Britain, but this is not the same as seeing culture as a mechanism for 
economic regeneration) a move towards treating them as if they were fits in with 
Vestheim’s view of what an instrumental cultural policy looks like. This movement 
towards extra-sectoral policy concerns places cultural policy in a precarious position, 
particularly if the anticipated benefits from using culture in such ways can only be 
demonstrated in a weak fashion (Gray, forthcoming).  
 
Such exogenous pressures on the cultural sector are not, however, the only ones that 
exist: endogenous ones can also serve apparently instrumentalising purposes. The 
process by which this can take place is through policy ‘attachment’ where actors 
within the cultural sector associate their activities with those that are found in other 
policy sectors altogether (Gray, 2002). The reasons for pursuing this strategy are 
normally where these other sectors have more resources (particularly financial ones) 
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available to them than are to be found in the cultural sector (as with social inclusion or 
urban regeneration), or where the other sectors have greater political significance 
attached to them (as, for example, with education or health). In either case the process 
of attachment allows the cultural sector to gain access to either scarce resources or 
political significance that would otherwise be unavailable to it. The consequence of 
pursuing such a strategy is that the cultural sector has to demonstrate that it is capable 
of delivering policy benefits for the sector that it has attached itself to, and not 
necessarily to the benefit of its’ own core activities.  
 
Other internal factors that can affect this process include internal re-configurations of 
policy sectors or components such that new room for manoeuvre can be generated for 
policy actors. Such activity has been identified as taking place within the museums 
sector as a whole (Hooper-Greenhill, 2000; Harrison, 2005) with a subsequent 
reappraisal of what museums and galleries exist for and how they may be made to 
operate in these new conditions. This would indicate that there is a process of internal 
choice taking place within the museums and galleries sector that alters the balance 
between differing functional activities (particularly between education, entertainment 
and curatorship). This process of choice can serve to make the sector more, or less, 
open to instrumentalising tendencies, depending upon how the new balance is 
managed and what ends or objectives it is directed to. 
 
The development of instrumental tendencies within the museums and galleries sector 
(as with cultural policy in general) is not simply a matter of deliberate, top-down, 
central government action. The role of endogenous factors, including internal sectoral 
changes, working from the bottom up, is of some significance in explaining this 
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phenomenon – particularly as central government does not have the power to directly 
control, in a managerial sense, what takes within the sector. The use of a large number 
of distinct governmental tools can push actors within policy sectors towards certain 
activities but it does not mean that these will necessarily produce the results that the 
centre either intended or desired (see, for example, Sullivan et al, 2004 on the case of 
public participation initiatives). The importance of unintended consequences in these 
processes of organisational and policy change indicates that a simple mechanistic 
explanation of instrumentalisation that is dependent upon an all-powerful central 
government is unlikely to hold true for all examples of such changes. While the centre 
can manipulate much of the context within which policy-making takes place the 
specific detail of what will happen, and the choices that will be made, also need to be 
taken into account.  
 
The results of an instrumentalisation of policy are, likewise, dependent upon how the 
implementation stage is managed within the organisations that are concerned. If 
instrumentalisation has been consciously adopted through attachment strategies then 
there is a possibility that the entire focus of the policy sector can become skewed 
away from the core concerns of the sector itself. In such a case the necessity to meet 
the instrumental aims of policy becomes even greater than would be the case if these 
core concerns were still in place. A failure to meet these aims may lead to an even 
greater loss of political support – and funding, and this may then reinforce sectoral 
weaknesses and make it even harder to generate support in the future. The motivations 
and intentions of those using such attachment strategies, and the context within which 
it occurs, would need to be examined to understand the potential for this to occur.   
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However, whether instrumentalisation arises from exogenous sources, such as 
sponsoring or funding bodies, or from endogenous sources, such as policy attachment 
or internal change, the opportunities to manage the evaluation process of performance 
management are important. The sorts of measures that are adopted, how they are then 
measured, and how they are employed by both data gatherers and external bodies 
have important implications both for the assessment of policy success or failure and 
for the inter-organisational relationships that tie the system together (Selwood, 2002). 
The management of this process of evaluation therefore provides opportunities for the 
management of the instrumentalisation process itself. Indeed it may even serve as a 
form of organisational displacement activity where attention to the process of 
evaluation and performance measurement replaces that on the actual provision of 
goods and services to the public, with the consequent creation of the modern-day 
equivalent of Merton’s (1940) bureaucratic dysfunctionalism. Whether this occurs or 
not, involvement in this stage of the policy process has become increasingly important 
in recent years and needs to be investigated further. 
 
Conclusions 
Whilst an instrumentalisation of cultural policies in general, and museums and 
galleries policies in particular, can be traced back to changes in governmental 
ideology and the subsequent reforms of public management that arose from this, it 
should also be stressed that political actors within these policy spheres have also had 
an effect upon the process in turn. Instrumentalisation is unlikely to be a conscious 
governmental strategy, appearing, instead, to be either an unintended consequential 
effect of other reforms, or a co-incidence of endogenous and exogenous changes that 
make it appear to be a viable policy response for policy actors in conditions of 
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uncertainty. In either case the process of instrumentalising public policies gives rise to 
a need to manage what is taking place - and how it is to be evaluated – and is subject 
to conflict between actors within differing organisations (Gray, 2000). Developing 
appropriate mechanisms for managing both the process, and the assessment of, the 
new tendencies in cultural policies is a continuous activity for participants in the field 
and is unlikely to be unambiguously resolved in the short-term in a fashion that will 
prove satisfactory for all of the participants who are involved in the process. 
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